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Abstract: 
This article seeks to add to the exploration and development of Imperial History’s 
contribution to the discipline of International Relations (IR). Focusing on British 
perceptions of Afghanistan in the period preceding the first Anglo-Afghan war the 
article considers colonial knowledge as a source of identity construction, but in a 
manner that avoids deploying anachronistic concepts, in this case that of the Afghan 
‘state’. This approach, which draws on the insights brought to IR by historical 
sociology, shows that engaging with Imperial History within IR can encourage a more 
reflexive attitude to core disciplinary categories. This not only reveals alternative 
approaches to the construction of specific political communities but it also allows for a 
more historicist mode in the use of history by IR as a discipline. Furthermore, by 
moving away from material based purely on diplomatic history, Afghanistan’s imperial 
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encounter can be recovered from the dominance of ‘Great Game’ narratives, offering an 
account that is more appreciative of the Afghanistan context. 
 
 
 
In January 2002, barely two months after Operation Enduring Freedom had toppled the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the former soldier, diplomat, and now Conservative MP 
Rory Stewart walked across Afghanistan, following in the footsteps of the Mogul 
Emperor Babur the Great. The title he chose for the work that followed the journey was 
The Places In Between,
i
 a reflection perhaps, of the enduring tendency to view 
Afghanistan as at the confluence of the ‘knowable’ – of civilizations, empires, nation-
states, or societies – and yet paradoxically resembling a land of the ‘unknowable’, of 
‘wild tribes’, nefarious actors; a domain of rumour, intrigue, and violence.ii As a former 
history tutor at Balliol College Oxford, Stewart was certainly aware that by making his 
trip he was also following in the footsteps of a collection of nineteenth century 
explorers - themselves often scholars, soldiers, and diplomats - all seeking to uncover 
this mysterious location ‘in between’ the imperial interests of British India, and Imperial 
Russia.
iii
 As with Stewart, these individuals produced works, and in some cases, 
provided the advice for policy makers as they sought to devise an effective foreign 
policy on India’s northwest frontier.iv  
 
The significance of this nineteenth-century colonial quest for knowledge of 
Afghanistan, and its relevance to the political decisions that were taken, has often been 
overlooked as a result of the more dramatic story of Anglo-Russian rivalry over Central 
Asia; the so-called ‘Great Game’. Commonly this quest is simply portrayed as a story of 
the swashbuckling adventures of a nascent colonial intelligence community, combating 
the spread of Russian influence.
v
 But as Benjamin Hopkins has shown, this was ‘far 
from the only, nor even the most important’ story at this time.vi The problem here is not 
one of fact, but of emphasis.  
 
In this article I aim to make two main contributions. Firstly, I seek to add to the 
development, and the exploration of, imperial history’s contribution to the discipline of 
International Relations (IR). In particular the article considers colonial knowledge as a 
source of identity construction for the colonial state, and therefore providing a line of 
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enquiry for contemporary IR theorists. But I seek to do so in a manner that avoids 
deploying anachronistic concepts, in this case that of the Afghan ‘state’.vii This 
approach, which draws on the insights brought to IR by historical sociology, shows that 
engaging with imperial history within IR can encourage a more reflexive attitude to core 
disciplinary categories. This not only offers insights into the construction of specific 
political communities but it also allows for a more historicist mode in the use of history 
by IR as a discipline. The need for this approach within IR is an argument frequently 
made, but less frequently carried out.
viii
 
 
Secondly, and to this end, I seek to contribute to the growing literature that seeks to 
recover Afghanistan’s imperial encounter.ix The common refrain that the British knew 
nothing of Afghanistan prior to the First Anglo-Afghan war needs revision. But more 
importantly, the article seeks to provide an alternative narrative to the traditional focus 
on geopolitics and grand strategy – a bias which is itself a reflection of the tendency for 
international history to focus on diplomatic sources to the detriment of more local or ‘on 
the ground’ accounts.x By drawing on a sociology of knowledge approach, the article 
charts the emergence of a set of criteria that provided a degree of legibility for policy-
makers, and in turn helped to order their policy prescriptions. Based on the observation 
that knowledge is in part a ‘participation in the cultural resources of society’xi this 
provides a more cultural basis for foreign policy decision making, but one which is 
inherently tied up in the process of interaction: of knowledge ‘becoming’ so, rather than 
simply ‘being’.xii  
 
The analysis focuses on the activities, correspondence and texts of a select group of 
itinerant explorers, military men, archaeologists, adventurers, and quasi-official East 
India Company representatives. Whilst initially uncoordinated, these individuals, I 
argue, began to resemble a ‘knowledge community’ through their correspondence and 
through the pooling of their work by an increasingly interested policy elite. Ultimately 
this knowledge community would contribute to the decision to launch an invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1838 in order to depose the ruler Dost Muhammad Khan for the 
preferred former-King Shah Shuja ul-Mulk. This community therefore created the 
groundwork for the emergence of the idea of Afghanistan in the imperial mind, as well 
as the foundations for policy prescriptions, and would leave an indelible mark on British 
conceptualizations of the Afghan strategic space.  
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Imperial history, IR, and historical sociology 
 
History and International Relations, it has been noted, have not always enjoyed an easy 
relationship.
xiii
 In the early 2000s there was a refocusing on this ongoing schism.
xiv
 On 
the one hand it was argued that such a debate would help to overcome certain ahistorical 
attitudes that had plagued IR throughout much of the Cold War period, tendencies that 
were in part a result of the transhistorical commitments inherent to the dominant 
rationalist and positivist theoretical approaches.
xv
 In a good example of this critique, 
George Lawson noted IR’s tendency to present history as ‘scripture’: ‘the mining of the 
past in order to confirm suppositions about the present; the smoothing out of 
differences, varieties, and processes of change in the interests of methodological purity 
and theoretical rigidity; and the bracketing off of history behind an eternal ‘‘illusory 
present’’’.xvi In short, IR was not just ahistorical, but also ahistoricist; reluctant to 
engage reflectively with categories such as ‘state’, ‘system’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘power’ and 
‘empire’.xvii  
 
As these scholars pointed out, a more historically sensitive IR would uncover the 
nuanced nature of such categories, demonstrating their historically contingent meanings, 
rather than black boxing them as essentialised, even reified categories. The coincidental 
rise of critical theory and constructivist approaches with their emphasis on linguistics, 
subjectivity, and the continual reproduction of social institutions offered a more 
questioning attitude to core categories and ontologies.
xviii
 Yet for some, this had only 
gone so far. As Colin Wight argued, ‘rather than embarking on new theoretical or 
empirical avenues, many scholars merely “poured the newly emerging patterns of 
thought into the old framework”’.xix The ‘cultural turn’ that constructivist approaches 
had carried into the field remained, for some, lacking in emancipatory spirit, tied as they 
often were to simple identity-based binary narratives of enemy/friend, or wedded to 
familiar (state-based) objects such as ideas of national strategic cultures. The prospect 
that constructivism – with its intellectual heritage deriving in part from critical theory – 
would offer a more historicist approach in IR’s engagement with history has in some 
respects fallen short of expectations.
xx
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This ‘historical turn’ (or ‘re-turn’ as Lawson rightly labels it)xxi entailed a move away 
from IR’s preoccupation with diplomatic history, which was becoming increasingly 
marginalized within disciplinary history anyhow, and a turn towards social and cultural 
history. Some called for greater attention in particular to imperial history,
xxii
 a field that 
had itself undergone a ‘cultural turn’, yet one by which IR remained curiously 
unmoved. As Tarak Barkawi, one of the leading proponents of an ‘imperial turn’, 
pointed out, ‘[r]epeatedly, it would seem, IR was founded amidst empire, but 
discovered instead only a world of sovereign states and their collective action 
problems.’ As he notes, the failure of social science and IR to deal with questions of 
empire and imperialism left the discipline inadequate ‘to the experiences and histories 
of most of the peoples and places on the planet’.xxiii For Barkawi and Laffey, 
engagement with imperial history offered a threefold benefit of escaping the ‘territorial 
trap’,xxiv highlighting the importance of hierarchy in international relations, and 
engaging with international relations as ‘thick’ social, political, cultural, and military 
exchange. Central to this was the proposal that histories of the European and non-
European world were co-implicated in each other; that imperialism highlighted process 
of co-constitution in state identity.
xxv
  
 
This ‘imperial turn’ has yielded some fruitful returns. Jordan Branch has shown how the 
spread of the territorial state was not simply the exporting of Eurocentric constructs of 
sovereign authority, but rather a process of ‘colonial reflection’ whereby colonial 
officials unfamiliar with local spatialities of power and authority were forced to rely on 
a more intelligible ‘scientific’ approach through cartography – a method that was then 
imported back to Europe.
xxvi
 Edward Keene, through his reframing of Grotius’ work has 
highlighted how the concept of ‘divided sovereignty’ – the idea that sovereignty could 
be shared by two powers - provided theoretical justification for imperialist ventures 
throughout the nineteenth century.
xxvii
 Meanwhile Gerry Simpson - although not 
focusing exclusively on empire - has nonetheless shown how during the nineteenth 
century imperial entities were responsible for the construction of a legal framework that 
institutionalized a form of ‘legal hegemony’ and ‘anti-pluralism’; one that mandated 
distinctions between ‘Great Powers’ and ‘outlaw states’, a distinction that he argues has 
left a legacy to this day.
xxviii
 Imperial history provides a reminder of the historical 
contingency of core categories whose ontological stability is often taken for granted. 
Equally, it shows that these categories were continually contested, not just within 
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imperial political thought, but in the process of global exchange, of which imperialism 
was simply one variant. In short, the constitutive effects of imperial exchange are often 
overlooked by an IR discipline that remains analytically imprisoned by its own theory-
driven orthodoxies.  
 
The documenting of Afghanistan’s imperial encounters provides good examples of the 
dangers of inadequate engagement with international history. Accounts often exhibit a 
‘continuist myth’ by presenting Afghanistan as the perennial location for competition 
between great powers and as the ‘graveyard of empires’. In addition, as Rob Johnson 
has argued, Afghanistan’s history is frequently looted, or ‘contested’, in order to 
provide a policy science for today’s challenges, drawing ‘a legacy of half-understood 
and often misconceived ideas from a long period of colonial contact, and distant 
memories of the Mujahideen struggle against Soviet Occupation in the 1980s’.xxix An 
important outcome of both of these trends has been the suppression of what could be 
described as the ‘Afghanistan context’. As Thomas Barfield eloquently puts it, ‘[a]ll the 
focus on war and visiting conquerors overshadows the country’s own inhabitants, 
except as the rough warriors who served as speed bumps on the highway of conquest or 
more recently earned a reputation for making the place ungovernable.  As a result, 
Afghanistan itself remains just the vague backdrop in a long-running international 
drama where others hold the speaking parts.’xxx  
 
In the case of the first Anglo-Afghan War, the status of Afghanistan is often suppressed 
for a wider concern with Anglo-Russian relations – the so-called ‘Great Game’ – an 
example of diplomatic history par excellence. The idea that the British were attempting 
to establish a ‘buffer state’ regularly fails to engage with what exactly was meant by a 
‘state’ in this context. Meanwhile policy failures are often attributed to generic and 
theoretically reversible administrative or political blunders rather than dealt with on 
their own terms.
xxxi
 The extent to which Afghanistan emerged in part as a figment of the 
British imagination, and the co-implication of local agents, including Afghans 
themselves in the crafting of their own nationality under the shadow of imperial power 
lacks attention. That this should be so not only highlights a lacuna in the historiography 
of this part of the world, but also offers insights in to the faint legacies that remain to 
this day concerning representations of Afghanistan itself, as well as representations of 
its political heritage – a heritage that is profoundly international. 
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As a way out of the inadequacies of IR’s engagement with imperial history in general, 
and as a contribution to the recovery of Afghanistan’s imperial encounter in particular, I 
propose closer attention to the knowledge community that emerged concerning policies 
on the East India Company’s northwest boundary in the lead up to the First Anglo-
Afghan war.  The reasoning here is that rather than assuming the Afghan state as an 
ontological prior, we can use a more localized approach, drawing on the sociology of 
knowledge, to uncover the calling into being of the Afghan polity as an actor; in this 
case, a process that was carried out by outsiders. Simply casting back over the archive 
in search of a nascent ‘state’ forms risks the charge of deploying an anachronism - in 
this case relocating a historically contingent social institution into a historical context in 
which such a category carried a different meaning.
xxxii
 Avoiding this requires attention 
to the language used, and a more historically sensitive approach. 
 
The fact is that the British rarely, if ever, referred to the concept of the Afghan ‘state’. 
Indeed, the lack of Afghan ‘statishness’ provided in part a justification for the First 
Anglo-Afghan War. The polity they envisaged was a conceptually heterogeneous entity. 
It encompassed ethnographic definitions based around British taxonomies of the tribal 
groups they had documented, and principal lineages within these. But it was also a 
geographic expression, delineated by highland and lowland groups, bounded by 
geographic features such as the Hindu Kush, and combining principal population 
centres: specifically Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat. Finally, patterns of authority were 
also multiple and often appeared in competition, thereby complicating a simple 
presumption of any single sovereign authority. Alongside the expressions of ‘King’, 
‘Sirdar’, ‘Khan’, and ‘tribe’ was the practice of the assigning of land tenures in return 
for military service, which provided a more measurable form of authority. The 
ambiguous status of non-Afghan groups, including diasporic merchant communities 
(Hindus, Armenians, Jews), and nomadic groups added to the confusion. And finally 
there was the less frequently noted role of Islam. The Afghan polity could therefore be 
described as an essentially contested concept, however, the knowledge community that 
formed around the definition of Afghanistan, and the concomitant growth of imperial 
policy interest forced a policy of ‘closure’ around this concept.xxxiii  
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Although the purpose of this article is not to innovate within the well-developed 
literature on the sociology of knowledge, it is necessary to begin with a brief outline of 
how I conceive this approach to be helpful in building the argument. Firstly, 
notwithstanding the considerable philosophical debate over what ‘knowledge’ really is, 
for the purposes of this article, and borrowing from Peter Burke, I understand 
knowledge to mean information that has been ‘‘cooked’, processed or systematized by 
thought.’xxxiv Noting Durkheim’s dictum that first one must understand social facts as 
things, Berger and Luckmann’s seminal work, The Social Construction of Reality, gives 
the practical suggestion that ‘common-sense ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘ideas’ must be 
the central focus for the sociology of knowledge’xxxv Whilst I agree with these 
sentiments, the role of ‘thought’ in the systematization of information, does make it 
necessary to refer to the deeper intellectual currents - often in the form that could be 
loosely referred to as ‘ideas’ - in order to contextualize that which passes for 
knowledge. In this sense, knowledge is in part a ‘participation in the cultural resources 
of society’.xxxvi  
 
Secondly, and related to this point, the forms of knowledge referred to in this article are 
not conceived of as resembling a purely intellectual or academic exercise. Colonial 
knowledge in particular provides capacities for action as a via-media between ideas and 
action.
xxxvii
 As Nicholas Dirks has pointed out concerning Bernard Cohn’s work: ‘The 
colonial state [can be] seen as a theater for state experimentation, where historiography, 
documentation, certification, and representation were all state modalities that 
transformed knowledge into power’.xxxviii Indeed, Cohn’s ‘investigative modalities: 
particularly those described as the ‘observational/travel’; ‘survey’; and ‘historiographic’ 
mode, provide a helpful backdrop in terms of contextualizing colonial knowledge 
practices at this time.
xxxix
 Although Afghanistan was never directly colonized, through a 
growth in colonial knowledge, the country was rendered more legible – albeit partially - 
for policy-makers. The representations that were included within the repertoire of this 
knowledge order were not necessarily recorded for the purposes of manipulation, yet 
through an implicit and sometimes explicit value attachment, they carried at least the 
potential for manipulation, should it be required, converting un-annexed territory into a 
more familiar ‘realm of possibility’.xl Indeed, as James C. Scott has highlighted, such 
quests for legibility can be seen as a general inclination of states, not just the colonial 
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state, showing that such a process in itself can lead to a tenuous reflection of reality by 
default. As he argues:  
 
‘Certain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of vision.  The 
great advantage of such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp focus certain 
limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality.  This 
very simplification, in turn, makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of 
vision more legible and hence more susceptible to careful measurement and 
calculation.  Combined with similar observations, an overall, aggregate synoptic 
view of a selective reality is achieved, making possible a high degree of 
schematic knowledge, control, and manipulation.’xli 
 
The knowledge community leading up to the First Anglo-Afghan War resembles a 
proto-knowledge order that provided the foundations for this later enduring aggregate 
synoptic view of Afghanistan. 
 
Thirdly, despite the apparent and actual projection of culturally-rooted, intellectual 
trends, and representations onto the Afghan space, this form of knowledge capture and 
sequestering should not be misinterpreted as a one-way process from metropole to 
periphery, or as an imperialist imposition of Eurocentric categories onto a non-
European space. This was certainly part of the story, but as more recent work (at least 
since the late 1990s) on this aspect of imperial history has shown has shown, imperial 
expansion, including practices of knowledge procurement, also involved exchange and 
interaction both within and between imperial territories, peripheries, and elsewhere.
xlii
 
An important aspect of British knowledge on Afghanistan was accordingly derived in 
part from their experience elsewhere in South Asia and Persia.
xliii
 Moreover, their 
reliance on local informants, including Afghan agents, as well as members of diasporic 
communities within Kabul and elsewhere presented a picture that derived from more 
than a purely Eurocentric bias.
xliv
 
 
Information, information, information: the emergence of a colonial knowledge 
community 
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The Afghanistan ‘knowledge community’ in the early stages, and right up to the first 
Anglo-Afghan war was a highly select group. Hopkins puts the documented number of 
Europeans visitors to Afghanistan prior to 1838 at just fifteen.
xlv
 Of particular relevance 
were those who filled an official capacity subsequent to their journeys. Three 
individuals stand out: Firstly, Mountstuart Elphinstone, who was the first envoy to the 
Court of Kabul in 1809, later becoming the Governor of Bombay.
xlvi
 Key to 
Elphinstone’s influence was his 1815 two-volume published text, An Account of the 
Kingdom of Caubul, which was the most significant outcome of his 1809 mission.
xlvii
 A 
second key figure was Charles Masson, a deserter from the Bengal Army,
xlviii
 who later 
became a newswriter and agent of the British in Kabul from 1834-8. Finally, Alexander 
Burnes, whose two trips under the auspices of the East India Company (EIC) led to his 
appointment as envoy to Kabul during the First Anglo-Afghan War. Alongside this core 
group we can also identify a more peripheral group of actors including Henry Pottinger, 
whose 1810 trip skirting the southern and western reaches of Afghanistan was followed 
later with a posting as political agent at Hyderabad during the 1830s;
xlix
 William 
Moorcroft, who in 1819 set off across Kashmir through Kabul and to Balkh; and finally 
Claude Wade, who recruited Masson, and as Political Agent in Ludhiana filled an 
important role processing and filtering intelligence reports.
l
   
 
There was an entrepreneurial spirit to these ventures, with funding often being lobbied 
for, and frequently sourced from well-connected company officials rather than being 
centrally administered. Even where ‘official’ support was gained, the Government of 
India generally paid only a passing interest in the results. This was especially so with 
regard to the earlier trips. In the case of Charles Masson, his official duties only began 
in 1834, a role he took up as a plea bargain in return for exoneration for his earlier 
desertion. This picture began to change in the 1830s as the EIC looked to expand their 
activities to India’s northwestern regions. Noting a shortfall in knowledge the President 
of the EIC Board of Control Lord Ellenborough declared in 1829 of India’s northwest 
regions ‘[w]hat we ought to have is Information. The first, the second, and the third 
thing a government ought always to have is Information’.li  
 
In the second half of the 1830s the influence of knowledgeable individuals therefore 
became increasingly apparent. John Kaye records that this interest coincided with the 
Governor Generalship of Lord Auckland in 1835, when the works of these adventurers 
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began ‘to be seen on the breakfast-tables of our Indian statesmen, or in their hands as 
they were driven to Council.’lii Indeed, Alexander Burnes’ published work of 1834 
caught this wave of private and public interest. Burnes was courted by the London 
elites, including Cabinet Ministers, the Foreign Secretary, and even enjoyed an audience 
with the King and Princess Victoria.
liii
 
 
Whilst attention grew, the individuals working on this area were demonstrating more 
coherence as a knowledge community. In the early 1830s Elphinstone and Burnes began 
a correspondence that continued up until Burnes’ death in the Kabul uprising of 1841.liv 
Indeed it is clear in the works of Burnes in particular, that he owed an intellectual debt 
to his mentor, and even carried with him on his first trip to Kabul and Bokhara a copy of 
his Account of the Kingdom of Caubul.
lv
 The published works of previous travelers were 
clearly consumed by their successors, with many accounts referring to the exploits of 
previous explorers; the names of Elphinstone and Moorcroft often arising, as well as 
other itinerant individuals. Due to the fact that his survey utilized local agents as an 
information source, Elphinstone’s trail blazing also left a legacy of contacts with whom 
the British were able to engage, and the exploits of feringhi (foreigners) left a lasting 
impression on local actors.
lvi
 The most significant of those who Elphinstone met was 
Shah Shuja himself whose exile from the Afghan throne during the 1820s and 1830s 
was funded under a British pension.  
 
Charles Masson and Henry Pottinger were also in regular contact throughout the 1830s 
due to Pottinger’s initial financial support of Masson’s archaeological work in and 
around Kabul.
lvii
 Pottinger’s familiarity with Masson led to his being introduced to 
Claude Wade, Political Agent at Ludhiana, who negotiated his recruitment as an agent. 
In 1837 Burnes finally met with Masson in Kabul at the end of Burnes’ commercial 
mission up the Indus; a trip that in itself had produced a wealth of information that was 
sent back to the Governor General.
lviii
  
 
Between this core group of actors, we see in the archives therefore, the emergence not 
just of a knowledge community, but increasingly a policy community. Whilst the 
transition between these two cognitive realms is necessary to understanding how 
knowledge of Afghanistan guided policy, it is to the content of this knowledge that we 
turn to next. 
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Knowing Afghanistan as a political community 
 
Whilst it is important not to create an undue sense of commonality between the works 
of the early European explorers of Afghanistan there are nonetheless some similarities. 
The works of Elphinstone, Masson, and Burnes, were located in the stylistic modalities 
of colonial knowledge.
lix
 Accordingly, the material recorded in these accounts was 
voluminous. This style was not simply an extreme form of empiricism, but was rooted 
in a wider intellectual milieu of colonial knowledge practice. Inspired by the works of 
Adam Smith surveyors sought to identify the interrelationships between all aspects of 
man’s life within society: economic, political, cultural and social. The object was to 
ascertain at what stage of development the society could be said to exist at (hunting; 
pastoral; agricultural; or commercial), and necessitated a wealth of collected data, 
including historical trajectories.
lx
 These methods created a generic set of interpretations 
by which it was proposed ‘Asiatics’ could be judged.lxi This led to the related 
intellectual tradition of ‘philosophical’ or ‘conjectural’ history which suggested that 
through the accumulation of a wealth of data, it was possible to reconstruct the 
development of societies, and what is more, identify affinities with societies 
elsewhere.
lxii
 As such, the imagined polity and society of Afghanistan was in part a 
reflection of intellectual fashions, and in part the importation of familiar models of 
South Asian (and Persian) societal development. Moreover, this had the effect of 
infusing colonial histories of foreign territories with imported notions of legitimacy. 
Through conjectural history the development of a political community was often viewed 
through these accounts as the history of the rise of one elite group over another. When it 
came to interacting with these communities the British were therefore crafting their own 
structures of significance, interpreted through their own culturally located intellectual 
understandings. 
 
Despite these similarities important differences between these works should be 
acknowledged. Personalities mattered in this sense. Whilst the rather formal 
encyclopedic style of Elphinstone betrayed his more academic approach, the 
travelogues of Burnes and Masson reflected their more pioneering spirit. These later 
adventurers were also located within a changing cultural context that included the 
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expansion of printing culture and public knowledge in Britain itself. Burnes in particular 
typified a romantic era of European exploration that included the voyages of Charles 
Darwin and, later on, David Livingstone in Africa. This public thirst for adventure gave 
prominence to the heroic deeds of those who had travelled to distant lands. Differences 
in style also resulted from institutional contexts. Alongside their published travel 
accounts Burnes and Masson’s official works betrayed the bureaucratizing and 
professionalizing trends that had shaped the East India Company throughout the first 
half of the nineteenth century. 
 
Elphinstone’s Account was by far the most comprehensive and complete of these works 
and his status as the foremost colonial expert on Afghan matters had a strong influence 
on subsequent works. For Hopkins, this influence amounted to what he terms the 
‘Elphinstonian episteme’, one that ‘definitively delineated the universe of the knowable 
regarding Afghanistan. All subsequent information, recorded and archived for the 
colonial state, would have to be fit into this episteme in order to be transformed into 
knowledge.’lxiii This knowledge order was both enabling and constraining; whilst it 
allowed the British a structure of legibility it also limited the flexibility of their 
observations.  
 
I. Bounding Afghanistan  
 
If as Benedict Anderson has argued, the nation is an ‘imagined community’, then we 
should not be surprised at multiple, competing definitions of Afghan nationhood.
lxiv
 
Nigel Allan identifies three. Firstly, the genealogical definition referring to the five 
major Pakhtun/Pashtun tribal groups living in and around the Peshawar vale; secondly, 
a wider genealogical definition referring to all Pakhtun/Pashtun groups; finally, the 
territorial definition which takes ‘Afghan’ as meaning anyone who lives within the 
territorial limits of the modern Afghan state.
lxv
 Elphinstone, facing this ambiguity, noted 
that the diversity in Afghan society, government, and bodily practice made it difficult 
‘to select those great features, which all possess in common, and which give a marked 
national character to the whole of the Afghauns [sic]’.lxvi Despite this, it was the first of 
these definitions that he preferred, an observation described by Hopkins as the 
‘Pashtunization’ of Afghanistan.lxvii Elphinstone’s observation on the origins of the 
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Afghan nation was based in part on scriptural accounts documenting the history of the 
Afghan people and written in Persian,
lxviii
 but it was equally clear that he saw the 
Afghan polity, in a territorial sense, as a multinational entity. The Afghans co-existed 
alongside Persians (including Tajiks), Balochi, ‘Tatars’, ‘Indians’, and other 
‘miscellaneous tribes’.lxix  
 
A related challenge facing explorers concerned where the borders of the Afghan polity 
lay. In part this was the projection of culturally contingent understandings of national 
space.
lxx
 In addition, cartographic practice was now a mainstay of Imperial 
administrative practice - an expression of a supposedly scientific approach to 
understanding the territories the British found on their frontiers, but also a familiar 
language that allowed the British to converse over territories in which spatial patterns of 
authority were unfamiliar to them.
lxxi
 This certainly applied in Afghanistan, an area 
whose social formations ‘thrived on territorial flexibility, defining space relationally’, 
and where ‘[d]istance, especially in regards to authority, was judged not in terms of 
farsangs,
lxxii
 but in a genealogical idiom.’lxxiii The cartography was further complicated 
by the fact that Shah Shuja’s authority was shrinking at the time. ‘The Kingdom of 
Kabul’ was in a process of flux as competing groups sought political power. 
Elphinstone’s approach to overcoming this ambiguity was to adopt ‘the test made use of 
by the Asiatics themselves’ defining ‘the King’s sovereignty as extending over all the 
countries in which the Khootba
lxxiv
 is read and the money coined in his name.’lxxv This 
definition, which ignored alternative foundations of authority, created an artificially 
expanded cartography of Afghanistan’s territory shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Map Taken from Elphinstone's Account Labelled 'Caubul On a Reduced Scale, Shewing [sic] its 
Relative Situation to the Neighbouring Countries'. As a rough guide, the modern territorial state of 
Afghanistan is bounded on its north, south, east, and west, by Bulkh (Balkh), Caubul (Kabul), Candahar 
(Kandahar), and Farrah (Farah), respectively. Additional important population centres include Heraut 
(Herat) in the northwest, and Peshawer (Peshawar) to the east of Kabul, on the present day border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
 
Such cartographic representations of the region appear to demonstrate a failure on the 
part of the British to comprehend the reality of facts on the ground, but in truth the 
British were well aware of the ambiguity of territory in the region. The frontier of the 
British Empire did not end with a line on the map, but rather faded out as influence 
became more tenuous, and knowledge more sparse. Indeed British diplomatic and 
commercial engagement in the region, including overseeing treaty negotiations, and 
mediating between warring parties can be seen as a partly a process of formalizing and 
apportioning territorial limits and possessions. A process that was also underway in 
India, which itself remained territorially and politically ill-defined. In the areas 
inhabited by ‘Afghans’ however, British involvement was far more limited, and thus 
contributed to a sense of unease with what ‘Afghanistan’ meant in territorial terms. In 
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effect, this territorial ambiguity was the manifestation of competing notions of 
sovereignty between colonial and Afghan understandings, an ambiguity that disturbs the 
more rigid understandings of sovereignty familiar to IR. This ambiguity was clear in the 
forms of political authority that Elphinstone identified. 
 
II. Authority, state, and tribe 
 
For Elphinstone, royal authority in Afghanistan was the hereditary preserve of the 
Saddozai sub-tribe of the Durrani tribal federation. He identified the principal function 
of the government apparatus to be that of deriving revenue, the main source of which 
was from land tenure, with the main expenses of the court being the payment of the 
army, the household, the court establishment, and the clergy.
lxxvi
 In order to reduce the 
tax burden on affiliated tribes, and therefore bolster the legitimacy of the King, revenue 
was drawn largely from non-Afghan constituencies such as Hindus and the territories of 
Peshawar and Kashmir – the loss of these two territories under Shah Shuja and Dost 
Muhammad Khan respectively, would put pressure on both rulers. The army was drawn 
mainly from Durrani rulers who were obliged to provide troops in return for their land 
grants (Tiyuls). In this sense, as Elphinstone summarized, ‘[t]he King’s object with the 
Afghaun [sic] tribes is, to get men from the western, and money from the eastern.’lxxvii 
But in assessing the authority of the King over the country as a whole, Elphinstone 
witnessed a tension between Royal authority, and the rule of the ‘tribes’, an observation 
that highlights the sense of sovereign ambiguity that prevails in his account.  
 
Elphinstone’s Account is perhaps most influential in the delineations he drew between 
these independent tribal ‘republics’. At the centre of this was the authority ascribed to 
what Elphinstone perceived as the royal clan of the Saddozai, a sub-tribe of the Popalzai 
tribe which was itself part of the wider Durrani federation. For Elphinstone, the 
Durranis were the Afghan political class, ‘the greatest, bravest, and most civilized in the 
nation’.lxxviii Durrani clan leaders formed the court nobility deriving ‘command and 
influence from the King’s authority’,lxxix and the patronage he disbursed. 
 
But this regal elite coexisted within the Afghan territory with a panoply of semi-
autonomous tribal units. Whereas the colonial construct elsewhere in India had led the 
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British to view ‘tribals’ as outsiders somehow cut off from Hindu and Muslim 
society,
lxxx
 Afghanistan presented a community based almost entirely on this concept to 
which the British had attached a value judgment. Rather than seeing this pluralism as a 
source of weakness however, Elphinstone praised the ‘high spirited republicanism’ of 
the Afghan political community – a healthy tension in which military support from the 
periphery was exchanged in return for non-interference by the ruling elite. This, he 
argued, ensured defence against ‘tyrants’ and paradoxically guarded against a collective 
descent into ruin across the entire country. The ‘tribes’ thus presented an alternative 
conceptual lens through which to view the Afghan polity. 
 
By the time of Masson’s arrival in Afghanistan in 1827, this ‘high spirited 
republicanism’ had given way to internal disorder. The twin effects of a civil war 
between the Saddozai, and the Mohammadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe, and the 
expansionist moves of Ranjit Singh’s Sikh Kingdom in the Punjab, had left the rule of 
Dost Muhammad Khan constrained to the immediate areas surrounding Kabul, and had 
cut off important sources of external revenue. In the eyes of the British, this disorder 
had opened up the state for pretenders to the throne. Masson, operating in the 
ethnographic mode elaborated by Elphinstone, wrote ‘if united under a capable chief’, 
the Ghilzai tribe, (who inhabited the area between Kandahar and Ghazni) ‘might … in 
the present state of the country, become the most powerful’.lxxxi  
 
Burnes’ account concurred, claiming that the ‘royal house of Cabool’ no longer existed 
‘as an ostensible part of the government’ with the different chiefs ruling independently 
of one another.
lxxxii
 Power, he claimed, was now fragmented between the population 
centres of Kabul, Kandahar, Peshawar, and Herat, with Peshawar effectively a 
dependency of the Sikhs, and Herat the last remaining outpost of the fallen Saddozai 
dynasty.  
 
Faced with multiple challengers for authority, including from within his own family, 
Dost Muhammad Khan had opted to consolidate his rule in the territories surrounding 
Kabul through a campaign of pacification and revenue collection – a process 
documented in Masson’s narrative. He had also shifted the foundations of his authority 
by issuing public expressions of his adherence to the Islamic scripture of the Sunna. The 
purpose was twofold: firstly, this call to faith enabled his constituency base to grow, 
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taking advantage of the military role of the Ghazi (religious fighters) drawn from the 
hills overlooking the Indus. Secondly, it allowed a move away from the genealogical 
foundations of the previous Saddozai claim to royal privilege. Indeed Dost Muhammad 
Khan was able to bridge the Sunni/Shi’a divide that Masson had noted as a growing 
schism within the Afghan political community through his maternal Shi’a descent. This 
growing role of religion in political affairs was noted by the British who were apt to 
view unfolding events as examples of ‘fanaticism’.  
 
In contrast to Elphinstone’s survey-based, top-down, elite-driven, concept of Afghan 
political authority, based on a unitary conception of co-dependent tribal entities, Masson 
presents a more fluid impression of rule. The outcome is the representation of Dost 
Muhammad Khan as primus inter pares, negotiating a balancing act between the co-
opting of potentially useful community leaders, whilst keeping them at a sufficient level 
of political power that they wouldn’t pose a threat to his rule. This was the 
demonstration of a negotiated process of rule that Elphinstone had hinted at in his 
Account, but he was perhaps less exposed to it in practice through his engagement with 
mainly courtly elites and their cohorts – a group he referred to as ‘the great’. Burnes and 
Masson on the other hand were both courted by competing elites, giving them a more 
fragile impression of Afghan rulership.
lxxxiii
 
 
The cumulative knowledge base upon which British conceptions of Afghanistan were 
based was therefore conceptually coherent but factually fractured. Observers such as 
Masson and Burnes found their observations frequently evaded a simple description. On 
the one hand this state of affairs reflected the ongoing ructions within the Afghan 
political classes at the time of their visits, but in a wider sense it also represented the 
uncertainties of what was a process of transculturation. The formation of the 
Afghanistan knowledge community was not simply a process of information gathering, 
but was also a process in which political conceptual criteria were transferred into an 
Afghan political universe, including notions of territory and sovereign authority. This 
was bound to generate uncertainties as colonial and Afghan understandings entered a 
process of dialogue. Increasingly however, policy imperatives drove a process of 
closure over the ambiguity that inhered within this construct.  
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Knowing Afghanistan at the contact zones: a policy science for the powerful 
 
As previously discussed, the 1830s saw a growing policy interest in affairs concerning 
the northwest of India. Not only did this prompt a greater demand for knowledge but it 
also increasingly attached such knowledge to policy prescriptions. The institutional 
structure within which this process took place can be understood by reference to what 
Ulrike Hillemann terms ‘contact zones’: sites for the transference of information, 
knowledge, concepts and ideas between the periphery and the metropole, and back 
again.
lxxxiv
 Three sites were central to the picture that the British were beginning to build 
up. Firstly, London, the Cabinet, and the Court of Directors of the East India Company 
(EIC); secondly Calcutta, and the office of the Governor-General; and thirdly the 
Punjab, and the political officers. Important to this understanding is that in London the 
EIC was reaching the twilight years of its role in determining political concerns in India. 
Despite the appearance of metropolitan centralism (The Prime Minister still retained the 
power to declare war, for example), British India was beginning to craft a distinct 
foreign policy for itself, one that would be more cognizant of regional realities, rather 
than as a tool of balancing what were essentially European geopolitical concerns.
lxxxv
 
This in turn meant that the post of the Governor-General was beginning to enjoy a more 
exalted position in the British colonial policy-making hierarchy; in addition the office of 
the Governor General was increasingly overseeing the collection of political, military, 
and diplomatic intelligence.
lxxxvi
 Whilst this had the effect of decentralizing the 
bureaucratic process away from institutions of the EIC, it also had the effect of 
recentralizing knowledge procurement within the circle of the Governor-General’s 
advisors. The growing activities of the political agents in the northwest were in part a 
reflection of this and their engagement with figures such as Charles Masson had the 
effect of officialising what had previously been a more entrepreneurial and open-ended 
knowledge community. 
 
Driving this at the metropole was an intellectual and policy climate that since the late 
1820s had exhibited signs of growing ‘Russophobia’. Two works by Colonel De Lacy 
Evans – On the Designs of Russia (1828), and Practicability of an Invasion of British 
India (1829) - had captured the imagination of a public wary of Russian moves against 
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the Ottoman Empire, and copies were duly sent to the British representatives in Persia 
and Bombay.
lxxxvii
 In Calcutta however, the assessment of the nature of this threat 
differed: the impact of ‘rumour’ amongst the local population was considered more 
dangerous. Believing that their position in India owed much to the perception of their 
superior military power the British worried constantly about any threat to this fragile 
edifice, particularly at the frontiers of their territory. As Lord Ellenborough, one of the 
more paranoid policy makers noted in 1830: ‘We dread … not so much actual invasion 
by Russia, as the moral effect which would be produced amongst our own subjects and 
among the Princes with whom we are allied, by the continued apprehension of that 
event.’lxxxviii  
 
The principal method of counteracting Russian influence had been the steady expansion 
of trade and these efforts centred on the Indus River. It was envisaged, that by 
establishing an ‘entrepôt’ of trade on the river, the benefits would emanate along 
commercial networks that worked their way westward through the Gomal Pass towards 
Herat, and northwards through the Bolan and Khyber passes, to Kabul and beyond. It 
was also hoped that this trading hub would present an alternative to the Russian-
controlled trade fair of  Niznii Novgorod the north, attracting merchants from Central 
Asia and thereby reducing the commercial influence of Russia. This was more than 
simply trade ‘following the flag’. Commercial enterprise was very much the ‘idiom of 
British governmentality’ at this time.lxxxix The exploits of Colonel Chesney in 
Mesopotamia provided a model for the project and the unsuitability of the Euphrates 
and Tigris meant the possibility of steamboats being transferred southwards; a new 
technology that it was hoped would benefit communications, trade, and security across 
the British territories.
xc
 To this end, in 1837 Alexander Burnes, along with three EIC 
officials, was sent on a second surveying mission to assess the commercial viability of 
the Indus River and the prospects of trade with Kabul. Burnes’ trip therefore satisfied 
the dual purposes of a commercial urge, and a desire for accurate political intelligence. 
The result was a far more policy-driven development of existing knowledge, the output 
of which went directly to the Governor-General, who as late as 1837 was lamenting the 
‘haze of confusion’ that existed beyond Lahore.xci 
 
The perception of a fractured Barakzai polity in the northwest had encouraged a spirit of 
cautious engagement with Afghan affairs through much of the 1830s and the wisdom of 
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commercial enterprise was not without controversy.
xcii
 Dost Muhammad Khan faced not 
only external threats from the Sikhs, but internal threats too from his Barakzai brothers 
at Kandahar and Peshawar. Aside from a brief alliance with Kabul during Shah Shuja’s 
failed attempt to reclaim his throne in 1833-4, Kandahar was autonomous, whilst 
Peshawar – although ruled by Dost Muhammad Khan’s brother - was perceived to be 
firmly under the yoke of Sikh power. Moreover, Kandahar’s geographic position left it 
vulnerable in British eyes to Persia, which was at the time laying siege to Herat. In a 
variant on ‘domino theory’, it was feared that should Herat fall, Kandahar would be 
forced to align with the Persians; and that in this scenario, the Persian community,
xciii
 
including Persian elements of the military – the Qizilbash - in Kabul would be 
encouraged into insurrection against Dost Muhammad Khan. Behind Persia, it was 
believed, lay Russian support. 
 
This regional threat complex is significant. On the one hand it shows the manner in 
which quasi-causal stories were beginning to emerge, but more significantly for our 
purposes here, it demonstrates the ways in which the British were socializing their own 
geopolitical fears into their knowledge-based lexicon of regional politics. The 
perception of threat heightened certain features of the Afghan polity, as the British 
imagined it, including inter-Barakzai feuds. Dost Muhammad Khan’s maternal Shi’a 
descent thereby became a threat, as Burnes argued, because it potentially aligned him 
with the Shi’a state of Persia.xciv The significance of this was not lost on Governor 
General Auckland who in June 1838 described Dost Muhammad Khan as ‘a 
kuzilbash
xcv
 [sic] to the Westward’.xcvi It is notable that those aspects of Elphinstone’s 
argument that drop out include the positive tension between centre and periphery that 
had previously held together the rule of Shah Shuja. British preconceptions also entailed 
a revised view of the political geography. Herat became viewed as the bastion of 
defence against Persian expansionism, despite the schism that existed by virtue of the 
ruler of Herat being a Saddozai and therefore outside of the ruling family of Dost 
Muhammad Khan.  
 
Sovereign competence: Dost Muhammad Khan and Shah Shuja 
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Having shifted his foundations for sovereign legitimacy from lineage to Islam, Dost 
Muhammad Khan came under particular scrutiny in his capacity to govern. Burnes 
noted that shrinking land revenue had been balanced by closer sovereign oversight of 
the trading customs house and an increased, but not overbearing commercial tax. Within 
Kabul, his esteem was judged as high. Despite this however, Burnes lamented the 
continual frittering away of this revenue on costly military campaigns. The Afghan-Sikh 
battle of Jamrud in early 1837 had underlined this point, and as Burnes argued ‘a 
diminution of [Dost Mohammed Khan’s] enemies will have the same effect as an actual 
increase to his resources.’xcvii The outcome of this was uncertain however. Burnes noted 
that even if Afghan-Sikh rivalry could be negotiated through an agreement over 
Peshawar (and this was considered unlikely), the ‘Mahomedan tribes inhabiting the 
mountains of Eastern Afghanistan … who now regard the Ruler of Cabool as the 
Champion of Islam, might then view him simply as an ambitious ruler seeking for 
personal aggrandizement’.xcviii In addition, the call to faith had alienated the Shi’a 
community of the Persian Qizilbash who bolstered his authority. Dost Muhammad 
Khan’s shift in the foundations of his legitimacy was therefore not only unfamiliar to 
the British, but - based on their increasingly nucleated view of the Afghan political 
community - ultimately unsustainable. 
 
The British retained an ideal-type image of the Afghan polity under the former Saddozai 
monarchy – and this was sustained by the intellectual heritage of Elphinstone. 
Moreover, Shah Shuja’s exile in the Punjab had allowed a regular channel of 
communication between himself and the Governor General, which he used to encourage 
the British of his continued popularity with vast swathes of the Afghan political 
community, as well as to encourage a perception of the illegitimacy of the Barakzai.
xcix
 
This impression was particularly strong at Calcutta. The appeal, to the British, of a 
return to Saddozai rule was not just a result of the intellectual legacy of Elphinstone’s 
concept of traditional authority, or in Shuja’s continued assertions of his legitimacy, but 
also in a sense of security that the British derived from the concept of a unitary political 
formation. By September 1837, the Governor General Lord Auckland was referring to 
the ‘triple power’ of Afghanistan.c For the British, Afghanistan increasingly resembled 
a fragmented polity amidst a sea of predatory tribal chieftaincies, monarchies, and 
states. Shah Shuja offered a sovereign order that cohered with the outdated official 
vision of a stable Afghan polity. 
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In March of 1838, the Secretary to the Governor General, William Hay Macnaghten, 
wrote to Burnes and Masson asking for proposed measures to ‘counteract’ the policy of 
Dost Muhammad Khan. Both replied with the suggestion that a British backed venture 
led by Shah Shuja with limited British financial and military support would achieve 
British ends. Burnes opined that British policy should be to make Kabul ‘as strong as 
we can make it and not weaken it by divided power … we should consolidate the 
Afghan power west of the Indus and have a King and not a collection of Chiefs.’ He 
added: ‘“Divide et impera” is a temporising creed at any time and if the Afghans are 
united we … bid defiance to Persia and instead of distant relations we have every thing 
under our own eye and a steadily progressing influence all along the Indus.’ci Masson 
concurred: ‘In aiding the restoration of Shah Sujah’, he proposed, ‘the British 
Government would consult the feelings of the Afghan nation, among which his 
popularity is great, and who even wonder that the Government has not before done it. If 
he avowedly advanced under British auspices, his success would be prompt and certain, 
little or no blood would be shed – he would be joined by all who are discontented with 
the Barrakzai rule … Even the Powerful Kazzalbash [sic] faction at Kabul would 
acknowledge the Shah, for they have no other object in promoting and abetting the 
designs of Persia, than to rid themselves of Dost Mahomed Khan.’ Masson further 
argued that the strength of this proposal lay in the potential it had to unite Kabul with 
Herat, which remained the last outpost of Saddozai rule under Shah Kamran.
cii
 
 
At the time Macnaghten made his request of Masson and Burnes he was on his way to 
meet with Ranjit Singh to discuss the possible options with regards to dealing with Dost 
Muhammad Khan. The Anglo-Sikh alliance was judged more important than placating 
the needs of the Barakzai ruler of Afghanistan, and during the summer months the 
Governor General and his cohorts developed the plans for a military invasion of 
Afghanistan that would replace Dost Muhammad Khan with Shah Shuja. At this point, 
the advice of the knowledge community became subsumed by the policy, but the 
framing they provided had nonetheless, guided that policy. At this moment, the 
knowledge formed by the Afghanistan knowledge community was marking a final shift 
from the ‘embodied knowledge’ that had been the mainstay of the early Company state, 
to the more official, or ‘institutional knowledge’ of the colonial state.ciii This entailed a 
  24 
more fixed conceptual order, as the ambiguities of the works of the early European 
explorers were ironed out for reasons of policy expediency. 
 
It remains to be said that of Elphinstone, Masson, and Burnes, none agreed with the 
eventual policy path chosen. Masson and Burnes both claimed that their advice had 
been misinterpreted, and that they had only proposed a light financial and military 
backing to Shah Shuja, in order to tip the balance of threat in his favour, and win over 
prevaricating groups within Afghanistan’s political community.civ Masson resigned 
from Government service in 1840 after being wrongfully detained as a spy for the 
Afghans in Quetta. In 1839 Elphinstone wrote to Burnes, who was by that time envoy at 
Kabul, to offer his opinions on the policy. ‘I have no doubt you will take Candahar and 
Cabul and set up Shuja but for maintaining him, in a poor, cold, strong and remote 
country, among a turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be 
hopeless.’cv Masson was even more outspoken. ‘It is to be hoped’, he wrote, ‘that the 
good sense of the British nation will never again permit such expeditions as the one 
beyond the Indus, to be concerted with levity, and to be conducted with recklessness’.cvi 
Such comments are priceless for those who seek to draw a line between the 
contemporary era and the past. But as Priya Satia has urged, Marx’s famous dictum that 
‘history repeats itself, first as tragedy, then as farce’, was not meant to be taken literally. 
Rather, history develops dialectically, and the conditions of possibility that allow this to 
happen are as much epistemological as they are material.
cvii
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the lead up to the First Anglo-Afghan War, the British may have seen a nation in 
Afghanistan, but it was a faint construct, contested both locally and regionally, and 
deriving more from a need to categorize a heterogeneous community than from any 
sense of the term ‘nation’ in its contemporary meaning. Moreover, the British did not 
yet see a state, and where they did, it was only as the crumbling ruins of the former 
Saddozai regime – a direct consequence of the impact of Elphinstone’s work. 
Knowledge of Afghanistan did not cause the Anglo-Afghan War of 1838-42, but 
insufficient attention to the construction of the idea of the Afghan polity in the minds of 
the British has overlooked this important conditioning factor in the decision to go to 
  25 
war. As Christine Noelle puts it, ‘[w]hile greater themes like ‘imperialism’ … point to 
the origins of British action, they fail to account for the manner in which the British 
attempted to extend their influence in Afghanistan’.cviii In short, knowledge of 
Afghanistan made the war imaginable in the first place.  
 
This article has sought to demonstrate the value of attention to colonial knowledge, 
which hitherto has received little attention within the IR discipline, despite the ‘imperial 
turn’ of the past decade. Colonial knowledge can be viewed as a ‘register’ of imperial 
international thought,
cix
 highlighting how core categories familiar to IR, including the 
state, sovereignty, and territoriality, can be viewed as emergent phenomena, rather than 
as pre-social, essentialized categories.  From an IR perspective, colonial knowledge 
provides not just a site for the construction of state identity by an external actor, but a 
site for dialogue between competing idioms of political order – in this case a British 
conception and an Afghan conception – albeit a dialogue dominated by the categories of 
the former over the latter.  
 
The development of what has been termed a ‘knowledge community’ on Afghanistan 
was a manifestation of an evolving approach to the collection and use of colonial 
knowledge more widely by the colonial state. In the case of Afghanistan, the use of this 
knowledge in framing the policies that led to the First Anglo-Afghan War, shut down 
the latitude and fluidity that was previously apparent in existing understandings of the 
Afghan polity, including competing sovereign orders, and the vaguaries of 
Afghanistan’s territorial reach. The knowledge community provided two principal ways 
through which the British could ‘imagine’ Afghanistan. On the one hand it provided 
evidence for a fractured, acephalous polity, at war with itself, unbounded, volatile and 
inadequately led by a ‘chief’, who had usurped the legitimate ruling dynasty and now 
threatened neighbouring powers in order to compensate for his own internal weakened 
rulership. This picture was heightened by the contrasting features of the polities – even 
‘states’ – surrounding Afghanistan that were apparently more bounded, stable, unified, 
monarchical authorities with whom the British could more easily conduct diplomatic 
and commercial exchanges. The difficulties that the British faced in scrutinizing and 
categorizing Afghanistan - ‘a country which’, as Burnes described it, ‘seemed as it were 
not’ - meant that the territory became more of a locational concept, continually 
contested in the imperial mind.
cx
 The march to war in 1838 forced a process of closure 
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over this definition. The second contribution made by the knowledge community was in 
providing an alternative scenario: reinstating the deposed Saddozai authority, under 
Shah Shuja, who could rectify the failings of the collapsed polity the British now 
believed they were seeing beyond the Indus river.  
 
Ultimately the knowledge community that grew up around the policy problem of British 
India’s northwest provided the sources for justifying a policy of conquest, and left an 
intellectual legacy that outlasted its relevance. The failure of the project to consolidate 
British presence in Afghanistan led to a sustained period of exclusion as Afghanistan 
settled into the colonial imagination as the epitome of a terra incognita, a true ‘outlaw 
state’.cxi The closest contact that the British had with the Afghans during this period was 
through the tribes of the North West Frontier and a tenuous system of ‘native 
informants’. The form of administration here mirrored the sense of exclusion that the 
British felt towards the territories to the north and west: not seeking to ‘integrate, 
civilize and modernize’, but rather to ‘contain, conserve and traditionalize’, drawing 
‘deeply upon the well of colonial memory’, thereby preserving the works of Elphinstone 
et al.
cxii
 Indeed Elphinstone’s work, being the most complete of its kind, had the effect 
of freezing in time British conceptualizations of the Afghan territories long after its 
relevance had expired. As late as 1887, over 70 years on from the first publication of 
Elphinstone’s Account, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine was still citing it as a key 
text.
cxiii
 Of Masson’s works, the famous nineteenth century geographer Sir Thomas 
Holdich wrote, ‘the most amazing feature of Masson’s tales of travel is that in all 
essential features we knew little more about the country of the Afghans after the second 
war with Afghanistan than he could have told us before the first.’cxiv Colonial 
knowledge on Afghanistan has cast a long shadow. 
 
Rescuing Afghanistan’s imperial encounter from the oblivion of great power diplomatic 
history demands closer attention to the sunken histories of this period. Imperial histories 
have for some time moved on from the sterile categories of official practice and instead 
embraced social, cultural and intellectual history to thicken their narratives and to give 
voice to the voiceless. Whilst the ‘imperial turn’ in IR has created space for the 
incorporation of such work into the discipline, there is much left to explore. In arguing 
for greater attention to colonial knowledge in particular this article has sought to 
conduct IR in the imperial mode, in a way that does not do damage to either the history, 
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or to the insights that IR can bring to the table. Doing so requires shedding traditional 
disciplinary adherence to unchanging conceptual baggage. 
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